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Fig. 1. File sharing across distinct administrative domains. Each administrative domain keeps track of its users
in a user account database. Alice cannot grant Bob access to files on file server A because Bob is not listed in
domain A’s user database.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet offers the possibility of global data sharing and collaboration. One class of
mechanisms commonly used by organizations is shared data access via file sharing, using
remote file access in distributed/networked filesystems. However, most existing systems
do not offer secure, scalable and dynamic cooperation across organizational boundaries.
When users in distinct administrative domains try to share files, either inefficient and cum-
bersome exchange of information or compromises in security result.
For example, consider users Alice and Bob, employees of two different companies, who
wish to collaborate on a project (see Figure 1). Alice and Bob have at least four approaches
to sharing project files:
(1) ask their system administrators to create accounts in their own administrative
domain for each remote user. This has several problems. First, it imposes an addi-
tional administrative burden, which is not scalable with increased users and projects.
Often the latency of opening an account for a new user is unacceptable. Second, cre-
ating an account for an external user raises escalation of privilege issues. Ideally the
user should only be able to use the account for the intended purpose, i.e., working on
the project files. However, an account could enable an external user to snoop, search
for local system vulnerabilities, use up CPU cycles, disk space, etc. Because of these
problems, company policy typically limits or prohibits the creation of accounts for
external users.
(2) share account passwords. This approach has serious security implications as it
causes lack of accountability and enables escalation of privileges.
(3) avoid employing an access control mechanism and put the files on the web or
anonymous ftp. This is an unacceptable solution if the content of the files is at all
confidential or sensitive.
(4) exchange files via e-mail or another out of band mechanism. This is an inefficient
way of working as it does not take advantage of any of the safeguards and conveniences
that a file system has to offer. In the event that the e-mails are sent in the clear, there
are obvious security concerns. While still not as convenient as a file system, sites like
www.filesdirect.com act as a broker between users in different administrative domains
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File 1 File 2
User X read read, write
User Y read
Fig. 2. An Access Control Matrix
and offer better security than unencrypted e-mail. However, such solutions require
trust to be placed in a third party.
While more approaches can be imagined, the four listed illustrate the challenges of file
sharing across organizational boundaries. This survey examines how access-control mech-
anisms of different distributed file systems handle file sharing across distinct administrative
domains. This survey is restricted to the topic of access control in distributed file systems,
and largely ignores other design features and tradeoffs, except where they impact access
control. It is clear that well engineered systems must pay attention to many diverse goals,
and the system designer must decide how to weigh different axes of interest during the
design phase. As a result, a system that evaluates well here may appear weaker when ex-
amined along other important axes. The survey should be interpreted for what it is: an
attempt to understand how the choices made by different system designers affect the abil-
ity of end users to share information, and control the sharing of that information, using a
distributed file system.
The rest of this survey is organized as follows. We establish a framework for comparison
in Section 2. Section 3 presents a survey of distributed file systems in our framework. We
discuss the results in Section 4 and conclude with Section 5.
2. COMPARISON FRAMEWORK
We survey selected distributed file systems to determine their suitability for file sharing
across organizational boundaries. To classify the surveyed systems we use the following
necessary features as axes of a comparison framework.
(1) Authentication. Authentication determines and verifies the identity of a user in the
system, i.e., providing an answer to the question: “Who is the user?” Traditional authenti-
cation mechanisms rely on maintaining a centralized database of user identities, making it
difficult to authenticate users in a different administrative domain as depicted in Figure 1.
Systems aiming to provide decentralized access control cannot rely on local identification
and must employ a decentralized authentication mechanism, or rely on indirect authenti-
cation.
(2) Authorization. Authorization determines the access rights of a user, i.e., it provides
an answer to the question: “Is user X allowed to access resource R?” The common way of
performing authorization is to look up a user’s rights in an access control matrix [Lampson
1971], e.g., such as the one depicted in Figure 2. The access control matrix is usually
implemented either in the form of access control lists (ACLs) or capabilities.
ACLs correspond to columns of the access control matrix. An ACL is associated with
every resource, i.e., every object in the file system, and lists all users authorized to access
the object along with their access rights. The identity of a user must be known before access
rights can be looked up in the ACL. Thus, authorization depends on prior authentication,
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
4 · Stefan Miltchev et al.
Fig. 3. Simplified structure of the UNIX file system (from [Farmer and Venema 2004]).
Fig. 4. On-disk layout of a typical UNIX file system (from [Farmer and Venema 2004]).
i.e., systems that rely on ACLs for authorization must use a decentralized authentication
mechanism to work across administrative boundaries.
Capabilities [Dennis and Van Horn 1966; Levy 1984] correspond to rows of the access
control matrix. A capability is an unforgeable token that identifies one or more resources
and the access rights granted to the holder of the capability. A user that possesses a capa-
bility can access the resources listed in the capability with the specified rights. In contrast
to ACLs, capabilities do not require explicit authentication. Capabilities can be transferred
among users, which makes them suitable for authorization across organizational bound-
aries. Because capabilities explicitly list privileges over a resource granted to the holder,
they naturally support the property of least privilege, an intuitively desirable goal in a sys-
tem design. However, because possession of a capability conveys access rights, capabilities
must be carefully protected from theft, which in a distributed system requires that they be
transferred over secure and authenticated channels [Tanenbaum et al. 1986]. In addition,
capabilities may make it more difficult to perform later auditing or forensic analysis. Es-
pecially for large-scale decentralized systems where the logs themselves or the meaning of
the information contained in the capabilities is spread across several system components,
collecting all the necessary information involves considerable effort.
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Fig. 5. Delegation of privileges, from an administrator to Alice, and from Alice to Bob. The administrator grants
Alice full access by issuing her the first certificate. Alice can then delegate read access to Bob by issuing him the
second certificate. To be granted access Bob must present a certificate chain consisting of both certificates.
(3) Granularity. Granularity is the extent to which a system contains discrete com-
ponents of ever-smaller size. E.g. UNIX file systems are organized within a single tree
structure underneath one root directory, internal nodes of the tree recursively represent
sub-directories of the root, and leaves of the tree can be either files or directories. At a
lower layer of abstraction, the same file system consists of inodes and data blocks (Fig-
ure 3), and yet another layer lower one can find zones, labels, and partitions (Figure 4).
A distributed file system must strike a balance between extremely coarse-grained and ex-
tremely fine-grained authorization. Some systems work at a coarser granularity of higher-
level container objects, e.g., directories or volumes. While coarser granularity decreases
the amount of access control meta-data and the number of access control decisions re-
quired, it can make sharing of individual files cumbersome for users. In turn, systems that
employ only fine-granularity access control can become difficult to manage, e.g. specify-
ing block-level access control when only file-level control is desired. Ideally, the system
should allow a flexible level of access control granularity.
(4) Autonomous delegation. We evaluate the suitability of file systems for file sharing
across organizational boundaries with minimal administrative overhead. A user should be
able to delegate access rights to another user, subject to administrative policy. Figure 5
illustrates delegation using authorization certificates. We identify the following require-
ments for delegation:
—Autonomy. To facilitate ease of file sharing and lower administrative overhead, the
delegation mechanism should be user-to-user, i.e., no administrator involvement should
be required. If delegation is not allowed by default, the administrator will need to be
involved in each permission change, becoming a significant bottleneck in large-scale
systems. Of course, this need not be a binary condition: for example, unlimited delega-
tion may be allowed between users of the same organization, but explicit administrator
approval may be required to delegate to external entities.
—Accountability. It should always be possible to determine who delegated access to a
particular user, at least as part of an auditing (forensics) process.
—Organizational independence. A user should be able to delegate his access rights to
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a user in a different administrative domain, if this is allowed by organizational policy.
Furthermore, this should be done while preserving accountability.
—Low Latency. A user should be able to access a resource as soon after a delegation as
possible.
—Transitivity. Delegation chaining should be possible, e.g., if Alice delegates access to
Bob, Bob should be able to further delegate to Charlie (creating a chain from Alice to
Charlie). A mechanism to restrict the right to further delegate and thus limit the length
of the delegation chain is also desirable. This allows the system to scale arbitrarily, by
pushing administrative responsibility to end users.
—Fine granularity. A user should be able to delegate a subset of his access rights, e.g., if
Alice has read and write access to a file, she should be able to delegate read only access
to Bob.
(5) Revocation. While the ability to grant access to users in different administrative
domains is very desirable, a distributed file system should also have provisions for revoking
access. Revocation in systems that base authorization on ACLs is conceptually simpler: a
user’s access to an object can be revoked by updating the object’s ACL to remove access.
Capability based systems must rely on timeouts encoded in the capabilities or centralized
revocation mechanisms, e.g., revocation lists or trusted on-line agents that determine if a
capability is still valid. An in-depth evaluation of revocation techniques for a capability
based system is presented in [Keromytis 2001; Keromytis and Smith 2007]. There is also
a fundamental tension between the requirement for revocation and caching. Once a file has
been cached by a temporarily trusted client, the client might allow future accesses even
after access to the file has been revoked by the server. The same tension applies also to
auditing as the client might allow access to the cached copy without informing the server.
We survey a number of distributed file systems in this comparison framework in the next
section, Section 3 and summarize the results in Table I and Table II in Section 4.
3. DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS
It is useful to divide systems into production and experimental, with the split centered on
the scale and persistence of deployment, use and experience. A reasonable rule of thumb
to designate a system as production would be one which has found wide-spread acceptance
with (at least) many thousands of users.
3.1 Production Systems
The initial analysis is an examination of how the access control mechanisms of production
systems handle file sharing across administrative boundaries. The need to be robust in the
face of mission-critical use often forces these systems to be conservative in their design
choices. Thus, fundamental considerations like performance, portability, robustness are
likely to take precedence over the features that are the focus of this paper. We anticipate
that readers of this survey will have used at least some of the file systems presented in this
section. Thus, our review of production systems is biased towards the user experience. We
review the systems in chronological order.
3.1.1 NFS. The Network File System (NFS) [Sandberg et al. 1985] developed at Sun
Microsystems remains one of the most widely used network-attached file systems. Security
in NFS appears to have been an afterthought, and global file sharing was not part of the
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Fig. 6. NFS architecture (from [Sandberg et al. 1985])
original design. However we choose to review NFS in our framework due to its familiarity
and widespread use; it makes an excellent baseline.
The NFS protocol uses the Sun Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [Lyon 1984] mechanism
as illustrated in Figure 6. The RPC protocol allows several styles of user authentication,
referred to as authentication flavors. The original NFS release used weak UNIX-style
authentication (user ID and group ID) allowing a user’s credentials to be forged (see Fig-
ure 7). Support for Diffie-Hellman and Kerberos version 4 authentication flavors was added
later, but UNIX style authentication (AUTH SYS) was the only mandatory flavor, and thus
the most commonly implemented. Host authentication is also weak, because it relies on
spoofable IP addresses or DNS names.
Authorization in NFS follows UNIX semantics [Thompson 1978]. Thus, access to every
file is controlled by the standard UNIX mode bits associated with the file. The permission
bits can be viewed as a simple ACL, that lists three principals: the owner of the file, the
group associated with the file, and the group consisting of all other users. Thus, we refer to
UNIX mode bits as UNIX ACLs throughout the rest of the discussion. The rights that can
be given to each principal are Read, Write and Execute. Before users can access a remote
file, privileged administrators must mount the file system where the remote file is located.
This is done through the mount protocol [Callaghan et al. 1995], through which file system
names are mapped to directory identifiers (handles). The remote server’s administrator
controls access by listing exported file systems and hosts allowed to mount them. A handle
for the top-level directory of an exported file system will be provided to hosts that are
allowed to mount that file system. Once that handle is acquired, no further use of the
mount protocol is needed. This is another weakness of the NFS security model: since
directory handles do not change often (or at all), revocation of mount privileges cannot be
assured.
While initially it appears that the object access granularity in NFS is at the file level, the
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Fig. 7. NFS trust model when using the AUTH SYS authentication flavor (adopted from [Callaghan 2000]). The
NFS server trusts client hosts A and B. Access control is enforced by inspecting the source IP address of RPC
requests. User Bob can legitimately access his files after authenticating to client A. However, a privileged user on
client B (Root) can easily assume the credential of Bob without knowledge of his password. Finally, user Eve on
client C can spoof the IP address of client A. Thus, RPC requests from C appear to come from A, and client C is
trusted, though it is not in the server’s access list!
Fig. 8. NFS access control granularity with the (remote) mount protocol. The server exports a file system (e.g.,
/home) to the client. An administrator on the client mounts the exported file system (e.g., under /mnt). Because
the server trusts the client to enforce file-access rights, object-access granularity in NFS is at the file system level.
server actually trusts the client workstation that mounts an exported file system to check
file-access rights (see Figures 7 and 8). This security problem was addressed with the
introduction of the ACCESS procedure in NFSv3. Because no strong host authentication
mechanism is used, security is based merely on matching the IP or DNS name of the client
workstation. Because a file cannot be shared without a file system being exported on the
server and mounted on the client, object-access granularity in NFS is at the file system
level. Once an exported file system has been mounted, the user perceives object access
granularity to be at the individual file level.
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Significant administrative involvement is required for Alice to share a file with Bob if
he resides in a different administrative domain. The administrator of Alice’s server must
trust Bob’s server and export a part of the local file system to it. The administrator of
Bob’s workstation must trust Alice’s server and mount the exported file system. Finally,
since access control is performed using UNIX permission bits, Bob must obtain an account
in Alice’s domain to have a meaningful UNIX user identifier (UID). Thus, autonomous
delegation between users in different administrative domains is not supported in NFS.
Revocation in NFS is conceptually simple. A server administrator can edit the export
list and remove directories or hosts. Administrators can also disable user accounts or edit
group definitions in the centrally administered user database. Finally, access to individual
files or directories can be revoked by changing the UNIX bit masks associated with them.
In summary, authentication and authorization in early versions of NFS were designed
assuming a tightly administered domain (e.g.,, a single campus LAN or extended LAN),
making it unsuitable for global file sharing. This view is reflected in some earlier litera-
ture. The creators of the Athena system [Rosenstein et al. 1988; Dyer 1988], which relies
on NFS and Kerberos, recognize some of the barriers to access control scalability, and in-
dicate the numerous ACLs in the system were difficult to administer. Further, additional
intermediate levels of access between administrators and users were desirable. The au-
thors of the Bones system [J. Scho¨nwa¨lder and H. Langendo¨rfer 1993] point out similar
problems.
3.1.2 AFS. The Andrew file system (AFS) [Howard et al. 1988; Howard 1988; Satya-
narayanan 1989; 1990; 1992] was developed at Carnegie Mellon University as a secure
distributed file system with centralized user authentication. The earliest version of AFS
was developed concurrently and independently of NFS, but its design was strongly influ-
enced by the need to scale to many thousands of users. This need for scalability drove
many aspects of its design, especially those pertaining to performance and security. AFS
introduced several improvements in access control mechanisms, e.g., richer ACLs and user
editable groups. The resulting reduced administrative overhead and improved scalability
of access control management, though limited to the local administrative domain, make
AFS very relevant to this survey.
Authentication in early versions of AFSwas based on a variant of the Needham-Schroeder
authentication protocol [Needham and Schroeder 1978]. Users could only share files with
other users in the same cell (i.e., AFS administrative domain). Cross-cell authentication
required users to have an account in each foreign cell where they wished to access files.
Later versions of AFS have adopted the Kerberos authentication system [Miller et al. 1987]
for purposes of standardization.
Kerberos version 5 [Kohl and Neuman 1993; Linn 1996] is a centralized authentica-
tion system based on symmetric-key cryptography. Administrative domains in Kerberos
are called realms. An administrator maintains the user database for each realm. A Key
Distribution Center (KDC) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) grant users tickets that al-
low them to access services on specific hosts in a realm. Because Kerberos relies on a
trusted third party and symmetric key cryptography, accessing services across administra-
tive boundaries is not straightforward. Administrators have to set up trust relationships and
exchange keys for users to access services in a different realm. While cross-realm authen-
tication has been studied [Trostle et al. 2001; Westerlund and Danielsson 2001], Kerberos
does not currently allow for autonomous delegation between users in different administra-
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tive domains. A more extensive evaluation of Kerberos for decentralized access control
scenarios is presented in [Keromytis and Smith 2007].
An AFS cell defined along administrative boundaries corresponds to a Kerberos realm.
Cross-realm authentication allows users to share information between their respective cells,
without possessing accounts in each cell. However, cross-realm authentication requires
administrator involvement, because a local administrator must configure in advance which
remote cells should be available to users in the local cell. Thus, AFS does not support
autonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains.
Authorization in AFS is based on ACLs associated with directories rather than individual
files. Thus, object access granularity is at the directory level. The authors argue that the
reduction in state and conceptual simplicity coming from a coarser granularity facilitate
scalability. AFS ACLs specify the operations that principals (users or groups) can perform
on directories, namely:
—read any file in the directory
—write any file in the directory
—list directory contents
—insert new files in the directory
—delete files from the directory
—lock files in the directory
—administer the directory, i.e., modify the ACL
If there is no ACL entry allowing a particular operation, access is denied. AFS ACLs can
also specify negative rights, i.e., explicitly state that a user is not allowed to perform one or
more of the operations listed above. When a request for access is evaluated, the entries in
the normal rights section of the ACL are examined first. Any permission associated with
the user on the negative rights section of the ACL are then subtracted. Thus, in the case
of conflicts, negative rights override positive rights. This mechanism facilitates rapid and
selective revocation, e.g., in cases where a user is a direct or indirect member of groups
with access to the object. Using negative rights, the user can be explicitly denied access to
the object while the user’s groupmembership information is being updated and propagated,
a process that may sometimes take significant time in a large distributed system. AFS also
retains the standard UNIXmode bits on files; however, these are not used to enforce access
on the server and only have local significance on the user’s workstation.
Group names are used in AFS ACLs to identify lists of users with particular access
permissions. Users can create and maintain their own protection groups - as opposed to
UNIX where only system administrators can manage /etc/group. Nesting of protection
groups is not allowed, i.e., a protection group cannot be a member of another protection
group. While user-configurable groups improve the ease of file sharing between users
in the same cell they do not address the problem of granting access to users in different
administrative domains.
More recent versions of AFS allow users external to the current cell to appear on an
ACL, e.g., an ACL on a server that is in the “cs.cmu.edu” cell can have an entry giving
“bob@cs.ucla.edu” rights on a directory. However, configuring the respective cells to sup-
port cross-realm authentication requires administrator involvement.
Revocation in AFS is conceptually simple. Because user accounts are centrally man-
aged, any account can easily be disabled. Any user’s access to a directory can be re-
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voked by editing the corresponding ACL. Using groups simplifies revocation considerably
- whenever there is a change of membership of a group, the change needs only to be made
in the definition of the group and not on each ACL concerned. In addition, negative rights
allow for rapid revocation if resolving and updating the user’s group membership is ex-
pected to take significant time.
The Coda file system [Satyanarayanan et al. 1990; Kistler and Satyanarayanan 1991;
Satyanarayanan 2002] is a descendant of AFS developed with the goal of being more
resilient to failures. Coda provides high availability through the use of two distinct but
complementary mechanisms, server replication and disconnected operation. However, be-
cause the access control model of Coda is based largely on AFS, it faces similar limitations
in regard to supporting collaboration between users in different administrative domains.
3.1.3 CIFS. The Common Internet File System (CIFS) [Leach and Perry 1996; SNIA
CIFS Technical Work Group 2002; Hertel 2003] is the distributed file system native to
the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems, and, due to its ubiquitous nature,
of particular interest to this survey. CIFS is not limited to the Windows platform as the
Samba project [Samba project ] offers open source implementations of a server and client
for UNIX based platforms. CIFS is based on the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol
[Microsoft Corporation 1996] originally developed at IBM in the mid-1980s [IBM Corp.
1984]. In CIFS every server offers a set of resources (directory tree, named pipe, printer)
to clients over the network. Whenever a resource is made available (shared) via SMB it is
given a share name. Before a user on a client can access a share they must authenticate to
the server holding the corresponding resource.
CIFS permits a number of different authentication methods. The SMB protocol defines
two security levels: share-level and user-level.
Share-level mode is a form of SMB authentication from the days of early corporate
LANs when security was not considered a top priority and PC operating systems (e.g.,
DOS) did not support user-based authentication. Thus, passwords, if used at all, are as-
signed to shares, not users, and are transmitted in plaintext over the network. Users that
know the name of a server and a share, along with the potential password, can gain access
to that share. A single share may have multiple passwords assigned, each granting different
access rights, e.g., one password may grant read-only and another read/write access.
Share-level mode, while still used, is considered deprecated and has been replaced with
user-level mode. A server employing user-level security makes use of username/password
pairs instead of sharename/password pairs. With user-level security, a user must first au-
thenticate and get a valid user identifier (UID), and then present the UID to gain access
to any shares. User-level security can be implemented using a plethora of authentication
protocols. It is possible to use anonymous or guest login, plaintext passwords, several
challenge-response variations (LanManager (LM), NTLM, NTLMv2), and, in more recent
versions, Microsoft’s implementation of Kerberos [Swift et al. 2002] or other mechanisms
based on the Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) [Linn 1997] and the Simple and
Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism (SPNEGO) [Baize and Pinkas 1998]. The
GSS-API enables source-level portability of applications to different environments by pro-
viding callers with a common interface to security services in a generic fashion. Thus,
security services can be supported with a range of different underlying mechanisms and
technologies.
Authorization in CIFS depends on the authentication level and the underlying file system
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access control mechanism. In share-level mode authorization is combined with authentica-
tion: knowledge of a password grants access to a share. In user-level mode the server could
in the best case use ACLs to control file accesses. However, ACLs may not be available
on all systems. Because CIFS was designed to work with DOS, OS/2, and Windows sys-
tems, the underlying file system on the server could be FAT, FAT32, HPFS or NTFS. While
FAT has no concept of file ownership and only supports 6 attribute bits (e.g., the archive,
hidden, read-only, and system bits), NTFS offers support for ACLs. Thus, depending on
version and the mechanisms supported by the underlying file system, authorization in CIFS
can exhibit varying degrees of sophistication: none (when anonymous access is allowed),
rudimentary (read-only or read-write access), or more fine grained access control (when
ACLs are supported).
Object access granularity in CIFS is at the share level. In a file system context a share is
a directory.
Like NFS, CIFS was designed for tightly administered domains and thus does not sup-
port all the requirements for autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries. As
expected, anonymous and guest access or share-level passwords do not provide account-
ability or fine granularity of delegation. If user-level security with stronger authentication
is used, delegation of access control cannot take place without administrative intervention.
Administrators must either create accounts for users outside of the local domain, or deal
with establishing complex trust relationships between different domains.
Revocation in CIFS can be accomplished in a number of ways. Sharing of a resource
can be turned off. Administrators can disable user accounts. If supported, ACLs on any
files may be edited to revoke access at a finer level of granularity.
3.1.4 NFSv4. In an effort to address requirements mandated by the wide-spread use
of the Internet, NFS version 4 [Shepler et al. 2003] proposes many improvements over
earlier versions. Stronger security and better suitability to deployment on the Internet are
the main design goals. A good overview of NFSv4 and a comparison with older versions
is presented in [Pawlowski et al. 2000]. We review the relevant changes in the context of
our framework.
NFS is based on, and relies on, the underlying security of ONC (Open Network Com-
puting) RPC [Srinivasan 1995], a remote procedure call framework developed by Sun Mi-
crosystems. NFSv4 mandates the use of strong RPC security flavors for authentication
(older methods, e.g., AUTH SYS can optionally still be supported). This is achieved by
adding a new security flavor based on GSS-API [Linn 1993a; Wray 1993] called RPC-
SEC GSS [Eisler et al. 1997]. RPCSEC GSS encapsulates the GSS-API messaging tokens
and acts as a transport for conforming security flavors. Examples of GSS-API implemen-
tations include:
—Kerberos version 5
—The Low Infrastructure Public Key (LIPKEY) system [Eisler 2000]. LIPKEY provides
an authentication model resembling the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), that makes it more
suitable for use on the Internet. Authentication with LIPKEY is similar to using an
HTTPS server with htaccess, i.e., the server is authenticated with a public key certifi-
cate, while the clients authenticate using usernames and passwords. Communication is
encrypted with a session key. This scheme relies on passwords being centrally man-
aged at the server, i.e., a user cannot delegate access to another user not listed in the
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centralized password database without administrator involvement. Thus, LIPKEY is not
suitable for autonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains.
—The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM) [Adams 1996]. In contrast to
Kerberos, SPKM is based on an asymmetric-key infrastructure. SPKM allows both uni-
lateral and mutual authentication to be accomplished without the use of secure times-
tamps. Thus, out of the existing GSS-API mechanisms, SPKM with both client and
server authentication using public keys is most suitable for global file sharing across
administrative boundaries. However, the GSS-API decouples authentication and au-
thorization, thus limiting the support for autonomous delegation across administrative
domains (see discussion in Subsection 3.2.9).
The implementation of user and group identifiers also influences the suitability of an
authentication mechanism for deployment across the Internet. Earlier NFS versions rep-
resented users and groups via 32 bit integers. This is unsuitable for global file sharing,
because user and group identifier assignments in different administrative domains are un-
likely to agree. NFSv4 uses character strings instead of integers to represent user and
group identifiers. Uniqueness can be guaranteed by using a format of user@domain or
group@domain and leveraging the global domain name registry.
Authorization in NFSv4 is enhanced over the UNIX mode bits used by earlier versions
with the introduction of support for ACL attributes. NFSv4 ACL support is similar to the
Windows NT model [Microsoft Corporation 2005; Swift et al. 2002]. The NFSv4 ACL
attribute is an array of access control entries. Access control entries can be one of four
types: ALLOW, DENY, AUDIT or ALARM. The ability to explicitly grant access to users
who are not the owner or in the group of a file improves flexibility over standard UNIX
ACLs. The ability to explicitly deny access facilitates rapid revocation.
NFSv4 eliminates the mount protocol by using initialized file handles like the public file
handle in WebNFS [Callaghan 1996a; 1996b] (A WebNFS client uses the special reserved
public filehandle as an initial filehandle rather than using the mount protocol). File-access
rights as specified in ACLs are checked on the server, not the client. Thus, while the server
administrator still exports file systems rather than individual files, object access granularity
is at the file level.
While NFSv4 introduces changes that facilitate global file sharing (elimination of the
mount protocol, introduction of public file handles, a global user identifier name space), au-
tonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains is still not possible
with the currently supported authentication mechanisms. Kerberos requires administrator
involvement for establishing trust relationships between realms, while LIPKEY requires
administrator involvement in account creation for the non-local user.
Revocation mechanisms in NFSv4 remain mostly unchanged and involve editing ACLs.
Support for more feature-rich ACLs and negative rights in ACLs are the major changes
over previous versions.
3.2 Experimental Systems
Our review suggests that widely adopted production systems are evolving from support-
ing file sharing within a single administrative domain to supporting file sharing between
different organizations with a pre-established administrative relationship, often referred to
as federation. However, production systems fail to address the problem of file sharing
between distinct domains with no pre-existing administrative trust relationship. In the fol-
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lowing section we examine a number of experimental systems and evaluate their support
for autonomous ad-hoc sharing between users in different administrative domains. Exper-
imental systems are not as widely adopted as production systems and their maturity can
range from simple proof of concept implementations to prototypes tested by a limited user
base within a university’s computer science department. Thus, our review of the following
systems is based on what authors claim can be done, rather than user experience, which
can put production systems at a disadvantage. We review the experimental systems in
chronological order.
3.2.1 Truffles. Truffles [Reiher et al. 1993] was one of the early systems to recognize
and address the need for file sharing between users in different administrative domains.
Truffles was built on the replication services provided by the Ficus file system [Guy et al.
1990] and added a mechanism for setting up secure file sharing without administrator in-
tervention. Sharing was at the granularity of a volume, i.e., a subset of a local file system.
Truffles used Privacy Enhanced Mail (TIS/PEM) [Linn 1993b; Kent 1993; Balenson
1993; Kaliski 1993] to authenticate users and provide a secure transport channel. Users
were identified by public keys bound to X.500 distinguished names in X.509 certificates
[CCITT 1989]. Truffles authentication thus relied on a hierarchy of certification authorities
(CAs). This limited autonomous delegation, because users from different administrative
domains still had to have a common root CA.
Authorization in Truffles relied on standard UNIX and Ficus access control mechanisms,
where each file has a standard UNIX ACL associated with it.
Truffles did not address revocation.
3.2.2 Bayou. Bayou [Terry et al. 1995; Petersen et al. 1996] was a replicated, weakly
consistent storage system designed for the mobile computing environment. To maximize
availability, users could read and write any available replica. The Bayou system used a
primary commit scheme to resolve conflicts, i.e., one server designated as the primary took
responsibility for commiting updates. Bayou is relevant to this survey because it was one
of the early systems trying to address the problem of enabling autonomous delegation by
using an authorization mechanism based on access control certificates instead of ACLs.
Authentication in Bayou was based on public-key cryptography. Every user possessed
a public/private key pair and was authenticated by the server using a challenge/response
protocol.
Authorization in Bayou was based on digitally signed access control certificates. Three
types of certificates were supported:
—access granting certificates granted a user access (one of read, write, or server) to a data
collection, the unit of replication. In the context of a file system the unit of replication
was a directory. The “server”privilege enabled a user to maintain a replica of the data on
his workstation or portable computer, i.e., to run a server for the data collection. Access
granting certificates were signed by a single trusted signing authority.
—delegation certificates delegated a user’s privileges from an access control certificate to
another user. Delegation certificates had to be signed by the delegating user.
—revocation certificates allowed the original signer of a certificate to revoke it. Thus,
access-granting certificates were revoked by the signing authority (administrator), while
delegation certificates could be revoked by the user that issued them.
As a side note, Bayou required separate certificates for read and write access.
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Fig. 9. Structure of a CRISIS transfer certificate (from [Vahdat 1998]). The transfer certificate is a chain of X.509
certificates. The first certificate is an identity certificate identifying the principal wishing to make the transfer by
his public key, K0. In each subsequent certificate the issuer transfers a subset of his available privileges to another
principal. E.g., in the first transfer K0 delegates privileges described by A1 to K1 and signs the certificate with
his private key, K1
0
. Certificates can be arbitrarily chained, e.g., in this example K1 transfers privileges to K2,
who in turn transfers privileges to K3.
All access-granting certificates in Bayou were signed by a single trusted signing author-
ity. This approach limits autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries, because
a user in a different administrative domain might be unknown to the signing authority. The
access control model in Bayou provided authorization at the granularity of a whole data
collection.
Revocation in Bayou was accomplished using revocation certificates. Revocation cer-
tificates were stored by write operations and propagated with the data collections to which
they apply. Thus, revocations of write privileges were applied at the primary server, and
there was no need to ensure that every other server be notified of the revocation.
3.2.3 xFS. xFS [Anderson et al. 1995], a serverless distributed file system, was de-
veloped as part of the UC Berkeley Network of Workstations (NOW) project. Any node
in the system could act as both server and client to provide all file system services in a
peer-to-peer fashion. The primary concerns of the xFS architects were better performance,
scalability, and higher availability than traditional file systems. However, the decentralized
architecture of xFS did not carry over to its access control mechanisms. Unfortunately we
were not able to find a detailed description of the xFS access control mechanisms in the
literature.
The xFS architects describe the system as appropriate for a restricted environment,
where machines trust one another’s kernels to enforce security, i.e., the system was de-
signed to operate within a given admnistrative domain. xFS nodes were split in two cat-
egories: trusted core nodes within the admnistrative domain and less trusted client nodes.
Trusted nodes ran the standard xFS file sharing protocol and acted as NFS servers to the
less trusted client nodes. Because communication with clients outside of the trusted adm-
nistrative domain followed NFS security semantics, xFS was functionally equivalent to
NFS for file sharing across organizational boundaries and consequently suffered from the
same limitations.
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HostID (specifies public key)
z }| {
vefvsv5wd4hz9isc3rb2x648ish742hy /
path on remote server
z }| {
pub/links/repository/sfscvs
Fig. 10. SFS self-certifying pathname (from [Mazieres et al. 1999])
3.2.4 WebFS. WebFS was part of the WebOS [Vahdat 1998] project at UC Berkeley.
The system’s authorization mechanism was based on a combination of ACLs and autho-
rization certificates. Thus, it is of interest to examine whether such a hybrid approach can
exploit the advantages of both mechanisms while minimizing the disadvantages.
WebFS was a global file system layered on top of the HTTP protocol. This approach
allows access to files through the file system using existing URLs as file names. The
security architecture for WebOS was called CRISIS [Belani et al. 1998]. Authentication
in CRISIS was based on X.509 certificates [CCITT 1989; Polk et al. 2002; Housley et al.
2002].
Authorization in CRISIS used a hybridmodel to best exploit the tradeoffs between ACLs
and capabilities. Principals that should have long-term access to an object were listed on
the ACL for that object. In the case of WebFS, each file had an associated list of users
authorized to read, write or execute. The principals listed on an ACL could then further
delegate a subset of their rights to an object by creating transfer certificates, short-lived
and revocable capabilities. Transfer certificates were encoded in X.509 format, digitally
signed and could be chained. Figure 9 shows the structure of a CRISIS transfer certificate.
Object access granularity in WebFS was at the file level. Autonomous delegation in
WebFS was limited since users could only delegate to users who had a certificate from
a CA trusted by the local domain. Because WebFS relied on a hierarchy of certification
authorities, users in different administrative domains still had to have a common root CA
to share files.
CRISIS had good support for revocation. If a principal was listed on an object’s ACL
his access could be revoked simply by modifying the ACL. When access was granted with
certificates, revocation relied on timeouts. Each certificate was first signed by the principal
making a statement with a longer timeout. The certificate was then counter-signed by a
principal of the signer’s choosing. The counter-signaturewas issued with a shorter timeout.
The counter-signer acted as a locally trusted on-line agent (OLA). The OLA checked if
a certificate had been revoked before refreshing its counter-signature with a new short
timeout. While the CRISIS approach allows for shorter timeouts, it also introduces the
need for trusted on-line agents.
3.2.5 Self-Certifying File System (SFS). SFS [Mazieres et al. 1999; Mazieres 2000;
Fu et al. 2002] was a global decentralized file system. SFS is relevant to our survey as its
major stated goal was to free SFS clients from any notion of administrative realm, making
inter-realm file sharing trivial. To accomplish this goal SFS introduced the notion of self-
certifying pathnames – file names that effectively contain the appropriate remote server’s
public key (see Figure 10). Thus, SFS needed no separate key management machinery to
communicate securely with file servers. By convention, SFS files could be accessed under
/sfs/Location/HostID/Path, where Location is the DNS name or IP address of the server,
HostID specifies the server’s public key, and Path is the path to the file on the server.
The resulting file names were difficult to remember due to the embedded cryptographic
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information, so symbolic links had to be used as a mnemonic aid.
SFS separated user authentication from the file system by removing key management
from the file system. Users in SFS were authenticated using public key cryptography. On
the client an agent program with access to the user’s private keys was used to authenticate
the user to a separate authentication server on the remote server. The authentication server
maintained a database mapping public keys to UNIX credentials (a user ID and a list of
group IDs). If a user did not have an account on a file server, the server defaulted to
anonymous access.
Object access granularity in SFS was at the file level. Object access control in SFS was
similar to NFS. Authorization was performed by matching the UNIX credentials returned
by the authentication server with standard UNIX ACLs associated with each file.
Autonomous delegation in SFS was not supported because users must have an account
on the authentication server trusted by the file server. This would not necessarily be the
case for users in different administrative domains. GSFS, a further development of SFS,
tried to overcome this limitation and is covered later in this survey.
Revocation of a user’s access in SFS was simple. Because the authentication server
hosts a centralized user database, the user’s entry in the database could be easily re-
moved/disabled. A user could also be removed from groups that appear on ACLs for files
he was no longer supposed to access. The authors also describe mechanisms for revok-
ing self-certifying pathnames using revocation certificates, should a server’s private key be
compromised. As an alternative, a user’s agent could also request HostID blocking from
the client. The second approach could be useful when no signed revocation certificate is
found, but access restriction is still desirable, e.g., due to system policy.
3.2.6 OceanStore. OceanStore [Kubiatowicz et al. 2000] was a proposed architecture
for global-scale persistent storage. Pond [Rhea et al. 2003] was the OceanStore prototype
containing many of the features of a complete system. The primary design goals of the ar-
chitecture were high reliability and scalability to billions of users. The system relied upon
an overlay network named Tapestry [Zhao et al. 2001; Hildrum et al. 2002] for decen-
tralized object location and routing. This allowed the Oceanstore designers to defer many
access-control decisions to the overlay. While cryptographic mechanisms were used to
deal with Byzantine failures (which would affect reliability) some of the access control is-
sues that would be addressed by a conventional file system were addressed by participation
or non-participation in the overlay (e.g., authentication) while other issues were addressed
more conventionally (e.g., storage and access of blocks and files by the file system itself).
Authentication of clients in OceanStore was based on public key cryptography.
The access control model of the Bayou system inspired the designers of OceanStore to
adopt an asymmetric authorization model with regard to reader and writer restrictions:
reads were restricted at clients via key distribution, while writes were restricted at servers
by ignoring unauthorized updates. Files were encrypted and the encryption key was dis-
tributed to users with read permission. A file was located in the system using its globally
unique identifier (GUID). The GUID is computed as the secure hash of the owner’s pub-
lic key and some human-readable name. The owner could choose an ACL for the object.
Write access was enforced at servers by verifying all write requests against the respective
object’s ACL.
The granularity of sharing in OceanStore was at the file level.
The overview of the OceanStore architecture and the description of the Pond prototype
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give no indication how delegation would be accomplished in the system. As described,
delegation granularity is coarse, i.e., limited to distinguishing between read and write ac-
cess. For read access delegation would be accomplished by communicating the key used
to encrypt the file. While this provides autonomy, there are difficulties with accountability
and the need to re-key and re-distribute the key to all legitimate users if revocation becomes
necessary. Write access is controlled with ACLs, and delegation in this case is subject to
the same limitations as other ACL based systems. The authors briefly hint at the possibility
of using a trust-management system such as PolicyMaker [Blaze et al. 1996] for expressing
richer access control policies, but no details are given.
Revocation in OceanStore would be handled differently, depending on whether it is read
or write access that needs to be revoked. To revoke read permission, the owner must request
that replicas be deleted or re-encrypted with a new key. However, old data from cached
copies could still be available to revoked readers. To revoke write access, the owner of an
object could modify the ACL for the object. Because all writes must be signed, servers
can verify requests against the ACL. While the access control mechanism of Tapestry is
not specified, revocation could possibly also be accomplished by blacklisting users so that
they can no longer participate in the overlay network.
3.2.7 CapaFS. CapaFS [Regan and Jensen 2001] used self-certifying file names as
sparse capabilities to control access to files by users in different administrative domains.
CapaFS dispensed with user identifiers altogether, thus eliminating the need to resolve the
identities of remote users locally. By relying solely on knowledge of the capability file
name for access control, CapaFS aimed to provide autonomous delegation across organi-
zational boundaries.
A capability file name consisted of two parts: a client part used by the client to locate
the remote server and a server part used by the server to find the file in local storage.
The client part contained the hostname and port of the server. The server part contained
the local path name and access rights on the server and was encrypted to protect it from
tampering. However, the resulting capability file names were long and meaningless to
users, and necessitated the use of symbolic links to assign meaningful names to remote
files.
There was no explicit user authentication in CapaFS: knowledge of the filename was
sufficient to obtain access to a file. Authorization was based on the access rights encoded
in the server part of the capability file name. Object access granularity was at the file level.
Because there was no local user identification in CapaFS, autonomous delegation was
easily achieved. To share a file, a user needed only to communicate the file name to an-
other user. Thus, no system administrator involvement was required. However, there were
a number of problems with the original CapaFS. Because knowledge of the file name pro-
vided access to the file, communicating file names to other users had to be done over a se-
cure and authenticated channel (however, no infrastructure for that was developed as part
of the system). The original CapaFS was also vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack
because there was no server authentication. The authors suggested implementing server
authentication by adding the server’s public key to the capability filename. Because no
client authentication was performed, there was no accountability in the original CapaFS,
i.e., there was no way of telling which particular user accessed a file. This made audit-
ing impossible in CapaFS. The authors describe a way of adding client authentication by
adding a client’s public key to the server part of the capability file names. The proposed
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approach allowed for delegation to specific users by including their public keys as an ex-
tension of the capability file name. However, there was no way for a user to delegate only
a subset of his access rights to another user, e.g., a user possessing a read/write capability
file name could not delegate read-only access to another user.
Revocation in CapaFS could be achieved by having the server keep a capability revo-
cation list (CRL) of all capability file names that have been revoked. This approach is
unlikely to scale well as the list grows with time. Because the user’s public key was not
included in the capability filename, the original CapaFS design did not support revoking
access on a per-user basis. Another approach to revocation suggested by the authors was
to limit the lifetime of a capability file name by including a timeout in it.
3.2.8 Fileteller. FILETELLER [Ioannidis et al. 2002]was a credential-based distributed
file storage system with provisions for paying for file storage and getting paid when others
access files. FileTeller was developed by a subset of the authors of this paper. Users used
a micropayments system to pay for both the initial creation of files and any subsequent
accesses to network-based storage. FILETELLER illustrates the use of trust management
credentials for both access control and payment resulting in an elegant and scalable archi-
tecture that works across organizational boundaries. Trust management [Blaze et al. 1996;
Blaze et al. 1999a] eliminates the need for ACLs by incorporating access control in a new
kind of certificate, namely an authorization certificate or credential. Such a credential di-
rectly authorizes an action rather than dividing the authorization task into authentication
and access control. Unlike traditional credentials, which bind keys to principals, trust-
management credentials bind keys to the authorization to perform certain tasks.
Authentication in FILETELLER was based on public keys. There were three participants
in the system: Network Users (NUs), Network Storage Providers (NSPs), and Check Guar-
antors (CGs). All participants were identified by their public keys. A network user had to
to authenticate with the storage provider before any file operation could take place. The
authentication protocol provided strong authentication and, optionally, let the user piggy-
back credential delivery to the NSP. Security protocols such as IPsec [Kent and Atkinson
1998] or TLS [Dierks and Allen 1999] could be configured to meet these requirements.
Authorization in FILETELLER was based on KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999b] trust manage-
ment credentials. A network user held one or more credentials issued by a check guarantor
indicating the user’s credit line with the CG, as shown in Figure 11. CGs played a role
similar to that of PKI CAs, sharing many of the deployment and operational limitations.
There were four kinds of credentials used in different parts of the system:
(1) Check Guarantor credentials, which specified a user’s line of credit.
(2) Microchecks, which authorized a payment from a network user to an NSP, or to an-
other NU.
(3) Server credentials, issued by the check guarantors, that identified complying storage
providers the network users can use.
(4) File-access credentials, initially issued by NSPs when a file is created, authorizing
subsequent access to that file by the owner. File owners could then issue further file-
access credentials, delegating access to other NUs.
Granularity of access in FILETELLER was at the file level, i.e., users were able to create,
read, delete, append to, or replace whole files. Whole files were prefered to individual
blocks for two reasons: to amortize the cost of a check verification over the transfer of
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Fig. 11. Network Storage Providers (NSPs) issue a KeyNote credential to each Check Guarantor (CG) authorizing
them to act as introducers of users, by in turn issuing them credentials. A file owner needs to convince a CG to
provide them with a credit line, also expressed as a KeyNote credential. The file owner needs to provide these
two credentials to the NSP, along with a microcheck conveying payment to the storage provider. In response, the
NSP returns to the file owner a KeyNote access credential, granting her full privileges in accessing the file.
Fig. 12. A user wishing to access another user’s file needs to have their own line of credit with a Check Guarantor
(CG), as well as a credential from the file owner granting them access to that file. When accessing the file, the user
needs to provide the credit-backing credential from the CG, a microcheck to the NSP, and the access credential(s)
to the file. If the owner has set a “pay-back” disposition for the file, an additional microcheck to the owner may
also be needed to gain access.
an entire file, and to avoid choosing some arbitrary block size and defining block-level
operations, which would tie FILETELLER to a particular file system philosophy rather than
make it a general file-storage service.
Autonomous delegation across organizational boundarieswas supported in FILETELLER
as shown in Figure 12. A network user with access to a file could delegate a subset of their
access rights to another NU by issuing a file-access credential. This delegation mechanism
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Decentralized Access Control in Distributed File Systems · 21
KeyNote-Version: 2
authorizer: "<Administrator’s Public Key>"
licensees: "<Alice’s Public Key>"





Fig. 13. Credential granting user Alice (as identified by her public key, in the Licensees field) access to file
Makefile.stefgjxg on host discfs.cis.upenn.edu. The 1024-bit keys and signatures in hex encoding have been
omitted in the interest of readability.
is transitive and does not require administrator involvement. Users did not have to reside
in the same administrative domain, however a user wishing to access a file served by a
given storage provider had to establish a line of credit with a CG that recognized the NSP
as valid. Because users were vouched for by a CG and uniquely identified by their public
keys, accountability was preserved. File attributes were used in file-access credentials to
allow fine-granularity delegation. These attributes were meta-data associated with the file
by the owner, and could be used to implement easy file grouping, associate security labels
with files, or for any other similar scheme. For example, a user could associate arbitrary
textual tags with each file, similar to the way popular websites allow the tagging of digital
photos and video clips; access control credentials could then use such tags as part of the
access control decision.
Revocation in FILETELLER was time-based and relied on credential expiration. As with
previous work on which FILETELLER was based [Blaze et al. 2001], CG credentials is-
sued to users were relatively short-lived, avoiding the need for credential revocation lists.
Other revocation mechanisms could also be used with FILETELLER, as specified on a per-
credential basis.
3.2.9 DisCFS. TheDistributed Credential File System (DisCFS) [Miltchev et al. 2003]
was developed by the authors of this paper with the explicit goal of allowing access to re-
mote users not known in advance to the file server. Thus, DisCFS directly addressed the
problem focused upon by this survey. DisCFS, like FILETELLER used KeyNote trust man-
agement credentials [Blaze et al. 1999b] to identify: (1) files being stored; (2) users; and
(3) conditions under which their file access is allowed. An example credential is shown in
Figure 13.
Users in DisCFS were identified by their corresponding public keys. Authorization in
DisCFS was based on trust-management credentials. Trust-management credentials con-
tain the identity (i.e., public key) of the user authorizing an action, and the identity of the
user authorized to perform the action (respectively, the authorizer and licensee fields in
Figure 13).
When a user wished to access a remote file, the software on the client’s workstation sent
the relevant credentials with a request to access the file on behalf of the user. The file server
passed the credentials along with a query to the KeyNote system. KeyNote checked the
signatures on all credentials, evaluated whether the conditions specified in the credentials
were met and returned an answer to the query. If the query was successful, the file server
granted the user access to the file. As part of this exchange, the server had to verify that
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a user was the legitimate owner of the public key present in the licensee field of the cre-
dential(s) she presented, i.e., that the user had knowledge of the corresponding private key.
In DisCFS, this was accomplished by establishing an IPsec connection between the client
workstation and the file server, using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [Harkins and Carrel
1998] protocol. File sharing then took place over this IPsec association.
DisCFS controled access at the file level, however trust-management credentials could
also be applied at a coarser granularity if system requirements favored a minimization of
state over fine-grained control.
DisCFS had full support for autonomous delegation between users in different admin-
istrative domains. If Alice has been granted access to a file, she possesses a credential
specifying her access rights (e.g., the one depicted in Figure 13). If she wishes to delegate
a subset of these access rights to Bob, Alice can create a new credential identifying her as
the authorizer, Bob as the licensee, and specifying Bob’s access rights in the conditions
field. Alice must then sign the new credential and send it to Bob along with her original
credential. When Bob requests access to the file, he must present the credential chain
consisting of both credentials. This mechanism provides autonomy and organizational in-
dependence: no administrator involvement is necessary, and Bob does not have to be a
member of the same administrative domain as Alice. Because each user could act as a CA
in DisCFS, the need for higher-level certification authorities was eliminated. Credentials
were signed to prevent tampering and could be sent in the clear or posted on the web (of
course, this is not a good idea in environments where privacy of file-access rights is desir-
able). DisCFS provided good delegation latency: users could begin accessing files as soon
as they were issued a credential.
DisCFS supported multi-level delegation. That is, if Alice delegates access to Bob, he
can then further delegate to Charlie by creating a new credential. It was also possible to
limit delegation to one hop. Trust-management credentials allow for fine granularity of
delegation: users can delegate any subset of their rights. The trust management engine
ensures that there is no rights amplification, i.e., if Alice is granted read access to a file and
issues Bob a credential granting read/write access, Bob will not be able to write to the file
using the credential.
Delegation in DisCFS preserved accountability, because the public keys corresponding
to each authorizer and licensee were included in the credentials.
Revocation in DisCFS was not as straightforward as in ACL-based systems, because it
was not always evident who had access to a resource. In a multi-level delegation chain,
a user is only aware of the next “hop”, e.g., if Alice delegates access to Bob, and Bob
delegates access to Charlie, Alice has no knowledge of Charlie, and thus no way to revoke
his access. Thus, DisCFS relied on timeouts in credentials to limit their useful life. As a
more user-centric system, DisCFS made a tradeoff and avoided the administrative overhead
of running on-line agents for revocation checks at the expense of having to use longer
timeouts.
3.2.10 WebDAVA. WebDAVA [Levine et al. 2003] was a web file sharing service de-
signed specifically for users in distinct administrative domains. WebDAVA was developed
by a subset of the authors of this paper. The system provided file transfer rather than
file-access services, i.e., files had to be transferred in their entirety between server and
client, rather than being manipulated in place. Thus, WebDAVA was not, strictly speaking,
a distributed file system. However, we examine it as another example of a system using
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authorization credentials to allow access across organizational boundaries.
Authentication inWebDAVAwas performed using a challenge-response protocol. When
the server received a file request it responded with a challenge containing a nonce and the
server’s public key. The client response included the user’s public key, the file-access
credential, and a newly created nonce credential signed with the user’s private key. While
the protocol details are somewhat vague, it appears only the client was being authenticated.
It is possible that the server was authenticated by other means, e.g., using TLS [Dierks and
Allen 1999].
Authorization inWebDAVAwas handled by KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999b] trust-management
credentials. The credentials authorized desired actions corresponding to the HTTP GET or
PUT methods. Downloading a file from the server was done via the HTTP GET method.
The PUT method allowed file creation or modifying a stored file by overwriting it. Delet-
ing a file was done by saving an empty file; the server notices that the file is empty and
removes it. Granularity of access control in WebDAVA was at the file level.
WebDAVA had full support for autonomous delegation between users in distinct ad-
ministrative domains. Users could delegate a subset of their access to any other users by
retrieving their public keys and issuing them a credential. Credentials were protected from
tampering by a signature and thus could be sent over e-mail or downloaded from the web.
For example, when Alice wants to allow Charlie to access a file stored on the WebDAVA
server, she needs to retrieve Charlie’s public key, construct the credential delegating ac-
cess to Charlie’s key, and then send this credential along with her own access credentials
to Charlie. Charlie must import these credentials and use them to access the file. While
Alice may use any mechanism to get Charlie’s key, WebDAVA provides a key-server that
stores the keys of the various users to simplify credential management. To transfer a cre-
dential to Charlie, Alice simply selects the credential and enters Charlie’s email address.
The WebDAVA client then creates an email message using these credentials and sends it to
Charlie. Charlie can use these credentials to download the file from the server. No admin-
istrator involvement is required and Charlie need not have any kind of relationship with the
WebDAVA server in order to download the files.
Revocation inWebDAVAwas handled by credential expiration and certificate revocation
lists. Each file in the system had an associated file that stored hashes of revoked credentials
and thus acted as a CRL. Credentials were passed on to the KeyNote compliance checker
for evaluation only if their hash was not found in the revocation file. The original issuer of
a credential could revoke it by uploading it to the CRL using the PUT method.
3.2.11 GSFS. GSFS [Kaminsky et al. 2003], a further development of SFS, is of par-
ticular interest to this survey as it was conceived with the explicit goal of allowing file
sharing between users in different administrative domains. GSFS tried to achieve this goal
with an access control mechanism based on ACLs.
Authentication in GSFS was based on public keys, similar to SFS. However, to facili-
tate global file sharing, the authentication server was modified to contact servers in other
administrative domains and retrieve remote user and group definitions (see Figure 14). For
the purposes of this discussion we define remote users to be users outside of the local ad-
ministrative domain. Remote authentication servers were referenced with self-certifying
hostnames, similar to file servers. A GSFS authentication server had to contact the remote
authentication servers of any remote users or groups listed as members of local groups.
Because of network latency and failures, it is not feasible to do this at the time an authen-
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Fig. 14. Overview of the GSFS authentication architecture (from [Kaminsky et al. 2003])
tication request is made. Thus, the GSFS designers traded off freshness for availability
by having the authentication server periodically (e.g., every hour) contact the remote au-
thentication servers of any remote users or groups listed in local group definitions. This
introduced a delay between when a decision to grant access had been made and when the
actual access could occur.
Authorization in GSFS was done using ACLs. The ACLs were similar to those used
in AFS, but were extended to differentiate between files and directories. Access rights
available in GSFS ACLs included the right to modify the ACL itself. GSFS ACLs could
list four different kinds of principals: local user names, local group names, public key
hashes, and anonymous entries. Public key hashes were the only way of listing a remote
principal directly on a GSFS ACL. Remote groups could not be listed directly on the ACL,
but could be included indirectly by making them a member of a local group.
As with SFS, object access granularity in GSFS was at the file level.
There are two scenarios for autonomous delegation in GSFS. In the first scenario, user
Alice may choose to share a file with user Bob in a different administrative domain by
listing a hash of Bob’s public key on the ACL of the file (assuming that Alice has the right
to modify the ACL of the file). However, if Bob wants to then further share access to the
file with another user, Bob must also be given the right to modify the ACL of the file.
As delegation chains grow longer, this approach will lead to longer and harder to manage
ACLs on the fileserver. It is also impossible to allow fine-grained multi-level delegation,
e.g., if Alice gives Bob read access to the file and wishes him to be able to delegate that
access, she must also give him the right to modify the ACL. However, in this case there is
nothing to prevent Bob from modifying the ACL and granting himself write access. Thus,
this approach is only suitable for limited one-hop delegation from a local user to a remote
user.
In the second scenario, Alice can create a local group (e.g., alice.friends) and list remote
users (e.g.,Bob) or groups from another administrative domain (e.g., friends@otherdomain)
as members of the local group. This assumes that there is a remote authentication server
for the domain that Bob or Alice’s other friends belong to. Remote groups can in turn
contain other groups and the nesting can be arbitrarily deep. Thus, indirection through
authentication servers can provide delegation. In contrast to public key hashes, multi-level
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Decentralized Access Control in Distributed File Systems · 25
delegation can be achieved, e.g., if Alice allows access to a group owned by Bob, then Bob
can add new members (which can be other groups) to the group. However, this approach
still makes it difficult for a principal to delegate only a subset of his access rights. For
example, if Alice has allowed members of the group managed by Bob read/write access,
Bob cannot delegate read-only access to Charlie.
Listing a public key hash directly has several advantages over using group or user names:
—Latency – because the user record does not have to be pulled from a remote authentica-
tion server, the user can begin accessing files immediately.
—Simplicity – users in a different administrative domain need not be associated with an
authentication server.
—Privacy – public-key hashes offer a degree of privacy by obfuscating the usernames on
a group membership list. Because anyone can query an authentication server and user-
names could correspond to e-mail addresses, group membership lists could be harvested
for purposes of sending unsolicited bulk electronic mail (“SPAM”).
Group and usernames on the other hand offer the following advantages over public key
hashes:
—Indirection allows for multi-level delegation. The remote authentication servers also
provide a single point of update if a user needs to change his key or revoke it.
—Naming – names are easier for users to keep track of than hashes and thus would im-
prove accountability and scalability.
Beyond the mechanisms for revocation available for SFS, GSFS had to handle revoca-
tion involving remote users and groups. Thus, revocation in GSFS was closely related to
freshness. If a remote user changed his key or was removed from a remote group record, it
would take an update cycle for the change to be reflected on the local authentication server.
On the other hand, access granted to public-key hashes in GSFS could be instantly revoked
by editing the ACL or group record.
4. DISCUSSION
Table I classifies the file systems studied in Section 3 within the framework defined in Sec-
tion 2. Systems that were not designed for file sharing across organizational boundaries
(NFS, AFS, xFS, CIFS, SFS) require substantial administrator involvement for merging
realms or account creation. The inability to list non-local users using ACLs in NFS, AFS,
xFS, CIFS and SFS makes it impossible for these systems to support autonomous delega-
tion across organizational boundaries.
The remaining systems reviewed in Section 3 exhibit varying degrees of support for
autonomous delegation. We present a more detailed comparison in Table II.
OBSERVATION 1. Systems that support autonomous delegation across organizational
boundaries use public-key cryptography for authentication.
It is hardly surprising that public-key cryptography is used as a building block for the
authentication mechanism employed by systems that need to scale beyond the local ad-
ministrative domain. Public-key cryptography eliminates the need for synchronous com-
munication with a trusted third party. The public keys of every host and user can be freely
distributed. Knowledge of the respective public keys allows two principals to establish a
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Table I. File system classification
Status1 Authentication Authorization Granularity Autonomous
Delegation
Revocation
NFS P AUTH SYS,
Kerberos




ACL (NT) File No ACL






ACL Directory No ACL
xFS E AUTH SYS,
Kerberos
ACL (UNIX) File system No ACL
Truffles E Public Key
(X.509)
ACL (UNIX) Volume Limited No
Bayou E Public Key AC Certifi-
cate
Data Collection Limited Revocation certificate
WebFS E Public Key
(X.509)
Hybrid File Limited ACL, CRL, OLA2,
Certificate Expiration
CapaFS E No Capability File Limited CRL, Timeout
SFS E Public Key ACL (UNIX) File No ACL, CRL
GSFS E Public Key ACL (SFS) File Limited ACL, CRL
DisCFS E Public Key Trust Mgmt.
Credential





File Yes CRL, Credential Ex-
piration
Fileteller E Public Key Trust Mgmt.
Credential
File Yes Credential Expiration
1Production (P) or experimental (E) file system
2locally trusted on-line agent
secure communication channel without external administrative involvement. Of the sys-
tems supporting autonomous delegation, CapaFS is the only one that does not employ
public key cryptography (in the original design).
OBSERVATION 2. Mechanisms based on pure capabilities cannot provide accountabil-
ity.
Systems based on pure capabilities like CapaFS exhibit a high degree of user autonomy.
However, our review of CapaFS revealed that if the capabilities are not tied to user identi-
ties in any way, it is impossible to meet the accountability requirement for delegation. In
addition, exchanging capabilities becomes problematic, because their content should not
be disclosed to third parties. The CapaFS authors recognize the problems of using capa-
bilities with no ties to user identities, however the proposed solution does not meet the
requirement for fine-grained delegation.
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Table II. Autonomous delegation support in networkeddistributed file systems
Autonomy Organizational
Independence
Low Latency Transitivity Fine
Granularity
Accountability
Truffles • • • •
Bayou • • • • •
WebFS • • • • •
CapaFS • • • • •1
Fileteller • • • • • •
DisCFS • • • • • •
WebDAVA • • • • • •
GSFS2 • • • • •
GSFS3 •4 • • •
1Only if user’s public key is included in capability filename.
2Public key hashes of remote users listed on ACL.
3Remote groups listed on ACL.
4Remote users must be associated with remote authentication server.
OBSERVATION 3. Mechanisms based solely on ACLs do not scale well to a user base
distributed across organizational boundaries.
The difficulty of supporting autonomous delegation in GSFS best exemplifies this observa-
tion. GSFS tries to address the problem of global file sharing using ACLs. However GSFS
offers only limited support for delegation. If public-key hashes are used to identify non-
local users, the formulated requirement of multi-level delegation is not met. If groups are
used instead, multi-level delegation is possible, however the requirement for fine-grained
delegation is not met. This illustrates the difficulty of using an ACL-based authorization
mechanism when the users are distributed in different administrative domains.
OBSERVATION 4. Authorization certificates come closest to fulfilling all requirements
for autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries.
Bayou, WebFS, DisCFS, WebDAVA and Fileteller meet most of the requirements for au-
tonomous delegation. These systems rely on some form of authorization certificates: ac-
cess granting and delegation certificates, transfer certificates, or trust-management creden-
tials. Transitivity of delegation is achieved by chaining the certificates. Successive links
in a delegation chain can only refine, and never expand, the access rights of the original
certificate. This ensures that the fine granularity requirement for delegation is met. By
supporting both transitive and fine-grained delegation, the systems based on authorization
certificates distinguish themselves from systems based on ACLs that tend to support either
transitive or fine-grained delegation, but not both.
OBSERVATION 5. There is a tradeoff between user autonomy and ease of revocation.
Systems based on ACLs (e.g., GSFS) do not provide full support for autonomous delega-
tion. However, access to an object can be revoked by simply editing that object’s ACL.
Some systems based on authorization certificates or ACL/authorization certificate hybrid
schemes (e.g., Bayou, WebFS) make provisions for delegation. These systems require
users in different administrative domains to have a common root CA. While this limits the
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users’ organizational independence, it also makes revocation easier, since only a limited
number of CAs must be contacted to update CRLs.
In DisCFS and WebDAVA, a more user-centric approach is taken. Users act as CAs
and sign trust-management credentials they issue themselves. Thus, delegation in these
systems has the highest degree of user autonomy. However, because access control is com-
pletely decentralized, revocation must rely on certificate expiration or online revocation
authorities.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This survey provided a new framework for analyzing the suitability of distributed file sys-
tem access-control mechanisms to the challenge of supporting global file sharing across
organizational boundaries. We identified authentication, authorization, granularity, au-
tonomous delegation, and revocation as necessary features of a system aiming to address
this challenge. Thus, these features formed the axes of the comparison framework we used
to survey selected systems.
While the focus of the survey has purposely been on distributed file system design, the
framework might prove useful in understanding the tradeoffs inherent in global access to
any form of shared data. The central concerns of scalability and ease of use pervade much
of system design and evaluation. While file systems provide naming and persistence, con-
cerns of access control for a networked shared memory (with more dynamic state) would
require access control as well. Overlay solutions (of which Web-based file systems can be
seen as an example) exist at least in part to overcome administrative inertia. For example,
port 80 is left open through most Internet firewalls to accommodate user web browsing,
and therefore file-sharing can overcome administrative resistance simply by accessing data
using HTTP. If the issue is achieving global “user-controlled” access in a secure manner, it
seems more effective to address this problem directly rather than employing a workaround.
Our analysis, summarized in Tables I and II, suggests how the problem might be addressed
effectively.
Systems based on authorization certificates generally provide better support for au-
tonomous delegation of access rights between users in different administrative domains,
compared to systems based on ACLs or pure capabilities. Therefore they are attractive
from the perspective of scalability, but there are some operational and ease-of-use con-
cerns, in addition to the problem indicated by Table I: all of these systems are experimental
and do not enjoy widespread use.
The major operational concern is revocation. Authorization certificates resemble ca-
pabilities, in that revocation is a challenge. Many systems attempt to achieve revocation
semantics with artificial means such as “keep-alives” or timeouts, which are inelegant and
introduce a window of risk: a certificate might have unwarranted access until a certain ex-
piration time is reached. Future research on revocation of authorization certificates should
seek to minimize the existing tradeoff between user autonomy and ease of revocation.
Themajor ease-of-use concern is the management of the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and certificates required for users to access data. Widespread PKI deployment would
greatly ease the deployment of systems that use trust management techniques, and a fo-
cus on ease-of-use would ensure that users have tools (or automated management systems)
that make the use of certificates for remote access to be transparent and seamless, relative
to local access of data. However, we must acknowledge the significant logistical difficulties
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in building, deploying, and operating a real-world PKI.
Both the revocation and ease-of-use concerns would be most effectively addressed by
moving at least one file system from experimental to production status.
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